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here is no economic issue more likely to make or break the 
political career of a large-city mayor than the city’s job 
growth or decline. Understanding why firms locate where they 
do and why they expand or contract has now become an 
important part of any mayor’s first course in good governance.
The paper by Stuart S. Rosenthal and William C. Strange 
belongs on the syllabus—it is careful research with an 
important message. Using a truly extraordinary sample of 
business locations by census tract for the New York 
metropolitan area, the paper reaches three conclusions. First, 
firms are attracted to locations populated by other firms, 
particularly in their own industry. The authors conjecture that 
this attraction is caused by a production spillover that 
economists call agglomeration economies. Second, the 
observable reach of these agglomeration economies is strongly 
bounded geographically, probably not much further than one 
mile from the center of current firm locations. Third, at present 
levels of employment density—remember, the New York 
metropolitan area and New York City in particular are already 
very dense locations—adding a new firm does not appear to 
have a very strong further effect on local employment; the 
multiplier effect is modest at best, perhaps no more than 25 
to 50 new jobs for every 1,000 additional jobs located at an 
employment center. These conclusions are valuable, perhaps 
provocative, and deserve a close look.
I should note at the outset that I am a great admirer of this 
line of research by Rosenthal and Strange. A companion piece 
to their study, recently published in the Review of Economics 
and Statistics, was the first to adopt the authors’ unique 
empirical approach to the analysis of business location.1 In that 
study, the authors use a national sample of firm locations 
organized by ZIP code and reach much the same conclusions, 
but only for six narrow, but still interesting, industry 
classifications: software, food products, clothing, printing and 
publishing, fabricated metals, and machinery. This study 
follows their original methodology, but here the authors 
examine new firm locations within one metropolitan area, use 
a finer geographical grid (census tracts are much smaller areas 
than ZIP codes), and search for effects more broadly: first, for 
“all industries” and then within the major employment 
categories of manufacturing; wholesale trade; finance, 
insurance, and real estate (FIRE); and services. The authors 
emphasize business services in particular.
The methodology used in both studies is straightforward. 
New firms will locate in a census tract if they can make a profit, 
where profits are defined by:
(1)               ,
where   are the profits (appropriately discounted) earned 
by the firm by locating in the census tract with a vector of 
location attributes  ;   is the vector of inputs the firm must 
buy to produce output   at that location using a location-
specific production function  ;   is the price the firm 
can charge for its output  , where the price also may be 
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location-specific; and   is the price the firm must pay for 
each input, where again, prices may be location-specific. 
Location attributes   include measures of local demand 
conditions when the firm produces a locally traded product 
(for example, restaurants), local supply conditions when the 
firm hires locally produced inputs (for instance, labor and most 
importantly land), and finally, any local resources that make 
the firm more or less productive (such as public infrastructure, 
harbors, clean rivers).
Also included in  , and central to the Rosenthal-Strange 
analysis, is the density of other-firm employment at a location. 
As first stated by Alfred Marshall, having many firms from the 
same industry close at hand enables each firm to attract and 
encourage specialty inputs, save on the transit costs of needed 
natural resources, and perhaps share in the development of 
industry-specific innovations. As first noted by Jane Jacobs, 
productive synergies may also exist between proximate firms in 
different industries. Restaurants thrive near theaters, software 
firms stimulate innovations by hardware firms, and hospitals 
encourage medical research and development. The presence of 
these Marshallian and Jacobian agglomeration economies, 
proxied here by existing employment in a firm’s own and 
related industries, promises higher total-factor productivity, 
greater profits, and, all else equal, new firm arrivals at the 
location. In fact, when deciding where to locate, firms are 
concerned only with the elements of A. As profit-maximizers, 
firms adjust their use of inputs to accommodate local prices, 
local resource availability, and local agglomeration economies. 
Thus,  ; therefore,  . If profits 
conditional on location attributes are positive, then firms will 
locate in the census tract; if not, they will stay away. As any New 
Yorker will say: “It’s location, baby!”
Finally, new employment at a location depends upon the 
number of new firms—“births”   in Rosenthal and 
Strange—and the number of jobs that arrive with these new 
firms  . Since new firms only arrive if  , predicting   
and   entails estimating a pair of regressions of the general 
form:
(2)                         and 
across a sample of census tracts, each with different values of  , 
where   and   represent new establishments and new 
employment in the tract, respectively. Rosenthal and Strange 
do so, both here and in their earlier national study, except in 
this case, the key variables in   are own-industry employment 
and other-industry employment at the location. In both 
studies, the authors are careful to allow for the fact that some 
census tracts—often more than half of those in their sample 
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The authors do not study the effects of location on the loss of 
firms and jobs, although this too would be a useful exercise.2
The “structural” profit relationship in equation 1 helps us 
understand what might lay beneath Rosenthal and Strange’s 
“reduced form” estimates of equation 2 and in particular the 
effect of current census-tract employment on the arrival of 
new establishments and new employment over the next three 
years. Current employment affects firms’ profits in three ways. 
First, current employment in a census tract might influence 
the price that new firms charge for their products,  . More 
current employment in an industry means more market 
competition for locally traded goods and services, causing a 
fall in product prices and firm profits; this effect discourages 
new firm entry and new jobs. Second, more current 
employment in a firm’s own industry raises the price of locally 
supplied specialty inputs (for example, skilled labor), while 
more current employment in all industries raises the price of 
local inputs generally (such as unskilled labor and land). 
Higher factor prices lower firm profits so that again new firm 
location and employment are discouraged. These two adverse 
effects of higher current employment are offset by the 
potential gains in total-factor productivity from Marshallian 
agglomeration economies with more “own workers” 
employment and from Jacobian agglomeration economies 
with more “all workers” employment. Whether the two 
adverse price effects of more current employment are offset by 
the positive effects of current employment’s agglomeration 
effects is an empirical issue.3 Positive coefficients for current 
employment—the key   variable in this study—in the 
estimated new establishment and new employment equations 
suggest that positive agglomeration effects offset adverse price 
effects; negative coefficients suggest that the negative price 
effects dominate (Rosenthal and Strange’s Tables 2 and 3, 
respectively).
What do Rosenthal and Strange find? That positive 
coefficients, and thus agglomeration economies, seem to 
dominate; and when statistically significant negative 
coefficients do appear, they usually obtain for “all workers” and 
not for workers in the firm’s narrower own industry. (See the 
results in the aforementioned Tables 2 and 3 for Model 2). This 
outcome makes sense. Negative price effects are most likely to 
arise from high factor prices—most likely the price of land and 
office space—in this metropolitan area’s very dense, high-
employment centers. The results for wholesale trade, FIRE, and 
business services are particularly instructive on the point.
Before we embrace the agglomeration explanation, 
however, we need to think a bit more critically about exactly 
what has been estimated in the authors’ Tables 2 and 3. The 
results show a statistically significant positive correlation 
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between old jobs and new jobs in a firm’s own industry; but 
correlations do not signify causation. For example, there may 
be a very attractive attribute within current (2001) high-
employment tracts—for example, a good highway location or 
harbor, low taxes, or easy public transportation—that leads 
these tracts to have high new (2002-04) employment as well. If 
so, we cannot conclude that current employment is causing 
new employment; rather, the cause of both is good 
infrastructure, low taxes, or a natural-resource advantage. If 
important location attributes are omitted from the Rosenthal-
Strange regressions but they cause both old and new 
employment to be jointly larger (or smaller), then the 
regression coefficients in Tables 2 and 3 will not be valid 
measures of causation. The estimated coefficients will be 
upwardly biased (overly large) estimates of the true causal link 
from old to new employment. Rosenthal and Strange are aware 
of this statistical problem. Their solution is to use industry SIC-
fixed effects as a proxy variable for omitted location attributes; 
but unless a firm’s SIC code is strongly correlated with omitted 
attributes, this control will be weak.4 Still, we cannot rule out a 
causal connection from existing jobs to new jobs. When one 
keeps this qualification in mind, the estimates in Tables 2 and 3 
stand as plausible upper bounds for a true causal impact of old 
jobs on new employment in a tract.
The study’s second conclusion, the one rightly underscored 
by Rosenthal and Strange, is in many ways the most important 
one. Whether causation or correlation, the connection between 
current jobs and new jobs is very local. Almost all of the effect 
of current jobs on future jobs is exhausted within one mile of 
the center of the census tract. If the connection is causal and 
arises from agglomeration economies, then spatially small 
governments will be sufficient to recognize, and thus fully 
internalize, all the benefits arising from productive firm-to-
firm interdependencies. If the observed connection measures 
an important omitted public policy—for example, 
infrastructure, local tax breaks, or better neighborhood 
services—then again the benefits can easily be internalized by a 
small local government. Indeed, large but still privately owned 
and managed industrial parks might be sufficient to do the job. 
This narrow spatial reach for firm or policy interdependencies 
means that economic development strategies can be locally 
designed, and most importantly, fully funded from locally 
raised revenues. Business improvement districts, as small 
governments designed to internalize firm and policy spatial 
interdependencies, make good sense in light of the Rosenthal-
Strange results. Countywide, citywide, or statewide funding 
should be limited only to those development policies with 
significant multicommunity benefits—for example, sharing 
the fixed costs of large transportation and telecommunication 
networks. Beyond that, economic development decision-making 
and financing should be kept very local.
Third, and again whether correlation or causation, the 
second-order—or multiplier—effects estimated here of adding 
new jobs to any location are very small, perhaps no more than 
25 to 50 extra jobs for every 1,000 initial jobs brought into a 
location.5 In the New York metropolitan area, retaining or 
attracting a large employer, such as a financial institution’s call 
center, will add those jobs to the location; but there will be a 
very modest multiplier effect of at most .05 jobs for every new 
job created. The reason for this modest effect is surely the 
current density of employment in the New York area. Most 
tracts are likely to have sufficient supply capacity to meet the 
needs of any new employers brought into the tract. More 
important, if the land area needed to accommodate new 
employment is scarce, then 1,000 new jobs will simply drive 
up rents and thereby discourage additional firm location. 
Remarkably, agglomeration economies seem sufficient to 
compensate fully for the rent increases imposed by the initial 
1,000 jobs—that is, the multiplier is even slightly positive. For 
economic development proponents and critics too, however, 
the lesson here is clear: In the New York metropolitan area, 
multiplier arguments used to justify economic development 
policies should be ignored.6
There is a final benefit of Rosenthal and Strange’s work for 
those of us who study urban economies. We have an important 
new fact against which to calibrate our structural analysis of 
firm location in dense urban areas. It is impractical to think 
that we will ever be able to disentangle statistically household 
utility and firm production functions from the myriad product 
and factor market interdependencies that define how real 
urban economies perform. What we can do statistically, 
however, is identify a set of carefully constructed “reduced 
form” facts that any well-specified structural model of an urban 
economy must replicate. A failure to “predict” these facts 
means that the structural model is likely to have been 
misspecified—that is, something is missing. The authors’ work 
here, and in their companion national study, gives us one such 
fact—I am willing to elevate it now to the status of a “robust 
fact”—that our structural models must reproduce. Whatever 
policy or technology shock that generates firm demand for   
new jobs in an urban economy,  , and maybe a bit more of 
those potential new jobs, must actually locate in the city. In the 
end, the model’s beneficial agglomeration effects must 
dominate the adverse price effects, but not by too much. 
Models that cannot match this benchmark are probably not 
appropriate for the study of economic policies in dense cities. 
On both the policy and research fronts, the paper by Rosenthal 




1. Rosenthal and Strange (2003). 
2. I cannot resist mentioning my own work with colleagues on the 
adverse effects of inefficient taxation on job location in four cities, one 
of which is New York City; see Haughwout et al. (2004). 
3. Rosenthal and Strange (2003) provide a cleaner estimate of the 
effects of agglomeration on firm location. In that study, they attempt 
through sample design to remove the effects of current employment 
on   and  . First, they examine narrower industry categories 
producing goods primarily intended for export from the production 
site to national or world markets; thus,  , the “world price.”  
Second, they use ZIP code areas as the unit of analysis. Because ZIP 
code areas are often very large—sometimes as big as a county—it is 
more likely that there will be an elastic supply of labor and land 
available to firms. If so, factor prices will be independent of demand 
shocks from more employment; thus,  . Assuming that these 
identification assumptions hold, the only remaining effects of current 
employment on new firm location are due to positive agglomeration 
economies.
4. Consider this test: Do all census tracts with many investment 
bankers have nearly identical public transportation and low income 
taxes? Do all census tracts with many machine shops have equally easy 
access to the turnpike? Are all warehousing centers near harbors or 
centrally located train yards? The answer is surely no; thus, omitted 
attributes will be imperfectly correlated with industry classification.  
The issue is how imperfectly correlated they will be.
5. This estimate is computed from Rosenthal and Strange’s Table 3, 
Model 2 estimate of the effect of 1(000) additional “all workers” 
within the one-mile ring of employment in a given SIC code: .0157 
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new workers in each SIC code in each census tract within one mile of 
the 1(000) additional workers. There are eighty-one industry SIC 
codes within the “all industries” category and roughly ten census tracts 
within a one-mile radius. Thus, the total new jobs will be 12.7 jobs = 
.0157·(81 SIC industries/tract)·(10 tracts/1-mile radius). In addition 
to the “all workers” effect, there will be an “own workers” effect.  
Assume that the 1,000 additional workers are spread evenly across the 
eighty-one SIC industries—the linearity of the model makes this an 
inconsequential assumption—and that the “own workers” effect is 
1.37 new jobs per 1(000) current SIC jobs, as estimated in Table 3, 
Model 2 for “all industries.” Then the “own workers” effect of the 
1(000) current jobs will be an additional 13.7 new jobs within the one-
mile radius: 13.7 jobs = 1.37[(1/81)·(1)]·(81 SIC industries/tract)·
(10 tracts/1-mile radius).  The total new jobs created from 1(000) 
additional current jobs is therefore 12.7 + 13.7 = 26.4 new jobs. 
I appreciate the authors’ assistance with this calculation. This is only a 
partial equilibrium effect, however, measuring the impact in the first 
three years after the “arrival” of 1,000 additional jobs and ignoring 
any feedback from these 26.4 new jobs back onto the original 2001 
economy. I concede the conceptual point but suspect that any 
additional effects are small. In conversation, the authors are more 
optimistic; they felt that doubling the 26.4 new jobs to 52.8 new jobs 
might be a better general equilibrium estimate. Either way, the total 
effect of adding 1,000 new jobs is modest.
6. For additional evidence that the multiplier effect of new location on 
own- or other-industry employment may be small, even in less dense 
counties, see Greenstone and Moretti (2003). The fact that the authors 
of that study find that land values rise with own-tax-financed subsidies 
to attract firms suggests that efficiency gains and agglomeration 
economies are at work. Such a result is consistent with the analysis 
here, but again it lacks a sizable multiplier.References
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